Strategy and Aspects of Monitoring / Control Strictly in Coordinated Subsystems

Authors

  • William José Borges Universidade Estadual de Maringá
  • José Paulo de Souza Universidade Estadual de Maringá

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5585/ijsm.v11i1.1781

Keywords:

Control, Transaction cost economics, Strategy, Strictly Coordinated Structure, Measurability.

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the approach structures of the strictly coordinated theoretical framework developed by Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999) as an expanded perspective of the firm, taking into account the food supply chains as an extension of the nexus of contracts proposed by Coase (1937) and taken up by Williamson (1985). The structures stand out as strictly coordinated. Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999) turn to identifying points of common interests that encourage firms to promote contracts between themselves in a strictly coordinated way, considering the degree of asset specificity involved in the transaction and the competitive forces that determine the search for strategic positioning organizations to achieve sustainable superior results.

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Author Biographies

William José Borges, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Administrador pela Universidade Estadual de Maringá. Mestrando em Administração na Universidade Estadual de Maringá (Brasil).

José Paulo de Souza, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Administrador pela Universidade Estadual de Maringá. Doutor em Engenharia da Produção pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Brasil).

Published

01.04.2012

How to Cite

Borges, W. J., & Souza, J. P. de. (2012). Strategy and Aspects of Monitoring / Control Strictly in Coordinated Subsystems. Revista Ibero-Americana De Estratégia, 11(1), 204–224. https://doi.org/10.5585/ijsm.v11i1.1781

Issue

Section

Articles