Kelsen's Pure theory and the critique to Aristotelian concept of justice

Abstract

The study of justice, while value pursued by the law, was always significant for legal philosophy. Since Antiquity until today, the philosophers of law give much emphasis to this subject. In the mat of this jusphilosophical trend, this assay intends to deal with some aspects of the concept of justice existent in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, taking as a basis the critiques woven many centuries later by Hans Kelsen. For the intent, the text also retakes some concepts of Pure theory of law with the aim of indicating: (a) the main reasons that had tried the interpretation of Kelsen and (b) the difficulty of a pacific acquaintanceship between the aristotelian and kelsenian conceptions about justice. Th e interface propitiated by Kelsen allows us the privileged condition of spectators of the intense and interminable shock between jusnaturalists and juspositivists.